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Abstract
Consider a marketing division of a monopoly firm that faces two marketing
options: Market enlargement and elasticity improvement. These options are
conceived in terms of the target of the firm’s advertising campaigns: Potential
new consumers versus existing consumers.
Using a CES demand function in a simple model, we demonstrate that
the two activities are complementary, so that for some cost configurations, the
firm will find it profitable to implement the two options together when either
option alone would result in a loss. This calls for the marketing division to be
integrated, rather than decentralized.
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1 Introduction
The concept of economic complementarity, initially introduced by Edgeworth and fur-
ther developed as part of early modern economic theory by many pioneering scholars
such as Samuelson (1974), has recently received renewed attention in the management
science/operations research literature through the work of Topkis (1978, 1998), which
gave it its modern elegant and unified mathematical structure. More recently, the
topic resurfaced again in economics, emerging as a leading theme of economic research
providing the ideal methodology for the study of games with strategic complementar-
ities and their use in industrial economics (Vives, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990
and Amir, 1996) and for comparative statics analysis (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994).
Another major sphere where the modern concept of economic complementarity
has proved fertile and inspiring is in the study of interconnected subsytems linked
by complementarity relationships. This strand comprises scholarly work in social sci-
ences, broadly construed, and includes the theory of the firm (Milgrom and Roberts,
1995), the emergence of modern manufacturing (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990), and the
wholistic approach to socio-economic systems along many inter-related dimensions,
including economic, social, financial, and historical factors (Hall and Soskice, 2001).
The main idea that ties together the otherwise disparate studies that form the latter
strand is that, in the presence of complementarities linking the various subsystems of
a global system, a separate study of any one subsystem alone, ceteris paribus, is likely
to be substantially oﬀ the mark in its key conclusions, simply due to its ignorance of
the underlying complementarity relationships1.
1For instance, one cannot simply compare the financial systems of the United States and Germany
in isolation from their overall socio-economic context, and conclude that one of them is superior
to the other. Instead, each of the systems is embedded in a much larger whole through a web of
complementarity relationships that have direct impact on its performance. As a result, each of the
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The present study is an attempt to apply this fundamental but simple idea to one
of the main functions of the firm: Marketing/product development2. Our starting
point is the well-known model of Dixit and Norman (1978), who evaluated the social
desirability of advertizing. In their model, a firm facing an isoelastic demand curve
can engage in advertizing activity as follows. It can make one type of advertizing
expenditure that has two somewhat inter-related eﬀects: Market expansion or an
upward shift in the demand curve and elasticity improvement3. The former eﬀect
reflects any attempt to reach out to new potential consumers while the latter aims at
increasing existing consumers’ willingness to pay for the product at hand. Both eﬀects
may be achieved in the form of informative advertizing, which provides information
about the existence or potential quality of a product, or in the form of persuasive
advertizing, which aims at convincing the consumer, in one way or another, that what
he really wants is the advertized brand. As to elasticity improvement, some types
of advertizing could reduce product substitutability for a particular brand, and thus
lower its elasticity of demand. This is true in particular for persuasive advertizing,
which in some cases creates a kind of perceived product diﬀerentiation that does not
correspond to a real diﬀerence in the product’s performance or characteristics4.
We modify the Dixit and Norman model insofar as we consider the firm’s overall
two systems is probably better than the other in terms of fitting well within its own whole.
2In a similar vein, there are some studies dealing with the complementarity between process and
product innovation for a firm, including Athey and Schmutzler (1995), Adner and Levinthal (2001)
and Lin and Saggi (2002).
3For a discussion of the theories of advertizing and the evidence of its use by firms, see Mansfield
(1996); Pepall, Richards and Norman (1999, Ch 10); Friedman, 1983; and Martin, (2001, Ch. 6).
4In the marketing literature, there is an extensive empirical strand aiming at categorizing ads in
the various media according to the number of information ”cues” contained in them. The overall
conlcusion is that ads contain little actual information that would usefully guide consumers’ purchase
decisions. See e.g. Resnik and Stern, (1997) and Abernathy and Franke (1996).
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marketing activity as consisting of two a priori independent activities, each con-
trolling one of the aforementioned eﬀects separately. This division rests thus fun-
damentally on whether a particular advertizing campaign is aimed at new potential
consumers or at existing consumers. Our objective is to establish in a very simple
framework the complementarity of the two activities, from the point of view of the
marketing division of the firm, thereby justifying the centralization of marketing ac-
tivities within the firm. To this end, we assume that the monopolist has at its disposal
three diﬀerent marketing scenarios: (i) market expansion alone, (ii) demand elastic-
ity improvement alone, (iii) both goals simultaneously. For the sake of simplicity,
the two activities are described in the most elementary manner possible that allows
us to make our point: By expanding a fixed outlay, the firm will be able to achieve
a fixed shift in the characteristic of interest, for each of the two options.
For the modified Dixit and Norman model, we establish the simple fact that
market enlargement is complementary to elasticity improvement, when both options
are modelled in the elementary binary manner described above. As a consequence,
there is a region of intermediate fixed cost levels for the two separate options such
that neither of them alone is profitable while the simultaneous implementation of
both is profitable. Furthermore, we will show that for such intermediate fixed cost
levels, the simultaneous investment in both options generates a profit that is higher
than the sum of the profit gains derived from the two separate activities. It follows
that the marketing division of such a firm should be not be tempted to decentralize its
operations in its attempts to reach out to new consumers and to existing consumers.
Such decentralization might well miss out on jointly profitable operations in cases
when each operation alone is unprofitable.
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2 The model
We consider a profit maximizing monopolist that faces a constant marginal produc-
tion cost c. As for the demand side, we adopt a modified version of Dixit and Norman
(1978) using the isoelastic demand function:
Q(p) = a p−b (1)
where a represents a measure of market size and −b is the constant elasticity of
demand. We assume that b > 1, so that the profit-maximizing solution is interior
(see below.)
The choice of such a demand function is not innocuous. First of all, the multi-
plicative form is deemed more realistic than the linear additive form in the managerial
economics/marketing literature. Furthermore, such a demand can be easily linearized
by taking logarithms, so as to allow for its parameters to be easily estimated via
standard regression.5 For the present paper, as will be seen, it allows for a potential
separation between the two marketing eﬀects that we wish to analyze.
The corresponding profit function is given by:
π(p) = (p− c)Q(p) (2)
From the first-order conditions, it is easily seen that the optimal price is then a




The level of mark-up thus depends in a simple way on the elasticity of demand. By
plugging (3) into (2) and rearranging, we get an expression of the firm’s optimal
5See Mansfield (1996, Ch. 3) for an illustrative discussion of the usefulness of the isoelastic utility
function in managerial economics.
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profit:
π∗ = ab−b( c
b− 1)
1−b (4)




, is here equal to −b, a
negative constant independent of the output level. It is well-known that a monopolist
always prices at a point where |∈| > 1, whence our assumption that b > 1. It is useful
to note that an increase in demand elasticity (corresponding to lowering the value of














It follows that the monopolist has an incentive to increase demand elasticity (i.e.
move ∈ closer to zero), which is what we term elasticity improvement throughout the
present note.
Without taking costs into account, it is easy to see that6:
Lemma 1 Market expansion and elasticity improvement are complementary activi-
ties.
6The formal concept of complementarity invoked here is due to Edgeworth, and corresponds to
the mathematical notion of increasing diﬀerences of supermodularity, which for a function of two
scalar variables is defined as follows. For all x0 > x and y0 > y,
F (x0, y0) + F (x, y) ≥ F (x, y0) + F (x0, y)
For a twice continuously diﬀerentiable function, this is equivalent to ∂2F (x, y)/∂x∂y ≥ 0 for all
x, y. This makes it apparent that the economic interpretation of the complementarity between two
variables is that having more of either one increases the marginal returns to having more of the
other.
The mathematical analysis of complementarity, and its far-reaching implications are covered in
full detail in Topkis (1998).
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Proof. As elasticity improvement corresponds to a lower b, we need only verify
that the cross-partial derivative
∂2π∗
∂a∂b is < 0 (see Footnote 5). Indeed, given that














3 The Three Marketing Options
Suppose that the firm’s marketing possibilities can be described as follows: Expend
resources on pursuing one of the following three courses of action.
(i) Option 1 : Market expansion alone.
(ii) Option 2 : Elasticity improvement alone.
(ii) Option 3: Both market expansion and elasticity improvement.
In the simplest theoretical framework, these three options can be described as
follows. For option 1, a fixed investment of Ka enlarges the market by a fixed amount
∆a. For option 2, a fixed investment in elasticity improvement ofKb increases demand
elasticity by ∆b, provided b−∆b > 1. For option 3, the associated cost is simply the
sum of the separate fixed costs, or Ka+Kb. (We are thus ignoring the possibility that
the cost of realizing the two types of marketing campaigns may be less than the sum of
the costs of the two separate campaigns, i.e. that there is a cost complementarity, or
economies of scope, between them. We will come back to this point in the discussion
at the end of the paper.)
The profit gain in case of market expansion alone is given by (cf. (4)):





Market expansion alone is profitable if πa > π∗, which reduces to the condition:
Ka < ∆aΦ , cKa (6)
where Φ = b−b( c
b−1)
1−b.





Hence, option 2 is profitable (i.e. πb > π∗) if
Kb < a(Ψ− Φ) , cKb (8)
where Ψ = (b−∆b)−(b−∆b)( cb−∆b−1)
1−(b−∆b).
As for option 3, if the monopolist undertakes both options at the same time, the




)1−(b−∆b) −Ka −Kb (9)
Hence, option 3 is worthwhile for the monopolist if
Ka +Kb < (a−∆a)Ψ− aΦ ,dKab (10)
A key property of this model is as follows (this is easy to verify computationally):
dKab > cKa + cKb (11)
There are three diﬀerent parameter configurations of interest for the analysis at
hand. The first is the low costs case, where both (6) and (8) hold. The monopolist
would then implement either option alone, as well as both options simultaneously.
The second is the high costs case, where Ka + Kb > (a − ∆a)Ψ − aΦ. In this
case, the monopolist would neither implement both options simultaneously, nor either
option alone.
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The third case is the intermediate costs situation, where (6) and (8) do not hold,
but (10) holds.7 In this case, of greatest interest to us, the monopolist would not
implement either option alone but would implement both options together.
As a numerical illustration, consider the following parameter values: a = 5, b = 2,
c = 3, ∆a = 2, ∆b = 0.5. If Ka = 0.2 and Kb = 0.7, hence Ka > cKa = 0.167 and
Kb > cKb = 0.694 but Ka + Kb < dKab = 1.139. The threshold level of aggregate
investment after which the firm does not invest at all is then higher in case of both
options implemented together or, in other words, the interval where the firm is willing
to invest is larger.8
It can easily be verified that, in both the first and the third case, the profit gain
from implementing both options together is higher than the sum of the profit gains
from implementing the two options separately.
All in all then, the firm would always implement both options together whenever
it is worthwhile to implement each of them separately, but the converse fails to hold
in the intermediate-costs case. This result is very robust, and in no way a reflection
of the binary nature of the investment options, as adopted in this paper. A version of
this result can easily be obtained when the two options are allowed to be continuous
decisions with a variable cost structure. Since the essential message is conveyed in
this simple framework rather succinctly, we opted for the resulting simplicity of the
exposition.
7In view of (11), it is clear that this case is possible, and in specific examples, it can be seen that
the parameter configuration implied by the three conditions here is robust and far from degenerate.
8Following the numerical specification, we have in fact that π∗ = 0.417, πa = 0.383, πb = 0.411,
πa,b = 0.65.
9
4 Complementarity and Investment
Since the firm faces binary decisions, for each investment opportunity, let 0 and 1
represent the decisions ”not invest” and ”invest” respectively. Denote by i ∈ {0, 1}
and j ∈ {0, 1} the decisions to invest in market enlargement and elasticity rigidity
enhancing, respectively. Then the overall profit function of the firm may be written
as
Π(0, 0) = ab−b( c
b− 1)
1−b












It is easily verified that:
Proposition 1 Π is supermodular on {0, 1} × {0, 1}, i.e.:
Π(1, 1) +Π(0, 0) ≥ Π(1, 0) +Π(0, 1).
Subtracting 2Π(0, 0) from both sides, this can be rewritten as
Π(1, 1)−Π(0, 0) ≥ [Π(1, 0)−Π(0, 0)] + [Π(0, 1)−Π(0, 0)],
which says that the profit gain due to the simultaneous implementation of both op-
tions exceeds the sum of the profit gains of the two separate options. This formalizes
the notion of complementary investment opportunities.
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The marginal returns frommarket expansion increase with increases in the elastic-
ity of demand. This finding is very intuitive in this context as it simply follows from
the fact that the firm will make higher profits if the newly attracted consumers have a
higher willingness to pay, which a higher elasticity presumes. Conversely, since super-
modularity is a two-way complementarity relationship, an alternative and equivalent
interpretation is that the benefit that the firm derives from an increased elasticity
increases with the overall demand, i.e. with the enticement of new consumers.
This conclusion has a simple implication for the organization of the firm’s mar-
keting division: A centralized decision-making structure is necessary, in that coordi-
nation of the two options considered in this note is warranted in view of the simple
complementarity argument developed here. In the intermediate range of the market-
ing cost parameters, two decentralized units each controlling one of the two options
would independently conclude that implementation would result in a loss for their
unit, while joint appraisal of the two options would call for joint implementation.
In reality, it can be argued that the separation of the two marketing options con-
sidered here is somewhat artificial and unrealistic, in that many types of advertizing
campaigns will always reach both types of consumers (though they may well be de-
signed to reach one type of consumers more eﬀectively than the other.) Observe that
this criticism reinforces our conclusion in that it implies that there is also a cost com-
plementarity between the two options that we have not taken into account. Indeed,
if implementing them jointly is less costly than implementing them separately, then
there is a new incentive for joint implementation that we have not considered. This
incentive would reinforce the demand side complementarity analyzed in this paper.
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